Endogenous monitoring in a partnership game
WebEndogenous Monitoring in a Partnership Game. Anna Sanktjohanser. American Economic Review, 2024, vol. 110, issue 3, 776-96. Abstract: I consider a repeated game … WebEndogenous Monitoring in a Partnership Game ... I consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I add a self-interested …
Endogenous monitoring in a partnership game
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WebJan 18, 2002 · Endogenous Monitoring in a Partnership Game. Article. Mar 2024; AM ECON REV; Anna Sanktjohanser; I consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I ... WebI consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I add a self-interested monitor who commits to obtain private signals of firms' …
http://www.econ.ucla.edu/people/papers/Obara/Obara398.pdf#:~:text=Then%20we%20discuss%20multi-task%20partnership%20games%20with%20endogenousmonitoring%2C,tend%20to%20be%20large%20whenmonitoring%20is%20not%20free. WebAnna Sanktjohanser is a microeconomic theorist with a focus on dynamic games. After receiving her DPhil (PhD) from the University of Oxford, Anna spent one year as a …
WebFeb 1, 2004 · Then we discuss multi-task partnership games with endogenous monitoring, where two players play H games (tasks) instead of one. The additional twist … WebEndogenous Monitoring through ... Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: Experimental Evidence Kamei, Kenju and Nesterov, Artem Durham University 23 May 2024 Online at …
WebThis paper studies repeated partnership games with only two public signals, the game studied in Radner Myerson and Maskin(1986) except that the stage game is discrete. It is well known that the public ... Ichiro Obara, "undated". "Endogenous Monitoring," UCLA Economics Online Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics. Michihiro Kandori & …
Webincentives achievable in an equilibrium, for any level of relational capital: an endogenous state variable capturing the \soft" capital goodwill or mutual trust in the partnership. Second, we show how imperfect monitoring of fundamentals helps to incentivize partners. Partnership cannot overcome the free-riding problem when fundamentals are ... hurt tendon top of footWebOct 11, 2024 · Then we discuss multi-task partnership games with endogenous monitoring, where two players play H games (tasks) instead of one. The additional twist is that we allow each player to choose freely ... hurt texasWebIn particular, we model both monitor ing and enforcement effort, where monitoring is captured by the probability with which a firm is audited and enforcement is a resource commitment to punish violations once they are detected. In addition, we model the regulatory choice of monitoring and enforcement as a two-stage game with complete … maryland durable power of attorney statute